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Abstract: Investigating the impact of armed conflict on schooling in Rwanda, we present 
four key findings. First, we find a strong drop in schooling, both when using DHS data and 
when relying on two waves of population census data bracketing the violence. Second, in 
contrast to previous findings, we show that there is no leveling off, i.e. the drop is not 
stronger for non-poor and boys. Third, we demonstrate that the armed conflict caused a 
drop both in primary and secondary schooling attainment, be it through different channels; 
the drop in primary schooling driven by slower grade progression and increased drop-outs, 
while the drop in secondary schooling mostly due to a decline in school initiation. Finally, 
our results reveal a spatial mismatch between commune-level genocide intensity and the 
drop in schooling. We test for several potentially confounding factors, but find that none of 
these factors can fully account for the mismatch. We conjecture that the impact of armed 
conflict on schooling in Rwanda was nationwide, both because the disruption caused by the 
genocide affected every corner of the country and because - besides the genocide - other 
forms of violence took place in Rwanda in the nineties. 
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1. Introduction 
Micro-empirical work on the impact of conflict on schooling mostly rotates around two main 
questions: what is the overall impact of armed conflict on schooling? Does the impact vary 
across different strata of the population (e.g. boys vs girls)? The answers provided so far have 
been mixed. As expected, most studies found a negative impact on schooling, e.g.  Swee (2009), 
Rodriguez and Sanchez (2012), Akresh and de Walque (2011), Shemyakina (2011), 
Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011). Other studies, such as Arcand and Wouabe (2009) and 
Valente (2011), estimated an overall positive effect. The evidence is even more mixed when it 
comes to the heterogeneity of these effects, for instance across gender: in some cases researchers 
estimated the impact to be stronger for boys (Akresh and de Walque, 2011; Justino et al., 2013), 
while in other cases they found it to be stronger for girls (Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala 
and Morán, 2011).  
There are two main reasons behind these substantial differences. The first relates to the 
specific setting of the case studied. The actual impact of conflict on education depends on the 
relative importance of the specific supply and demand factors for education at work.1  These 
factors, in turn, are determined by the context studied, which varies from case to case. First, 
armed conflicts differ in intensity, duration, geographic spread, and in the nature of the 
destruction - taking a large human toll or mostly destroying infrastructures. Second, the 
socioeconomic context plays an important role, for instance in terms of coping mechanisms that 
the households have at their disposal, or the prevailing social norms concerning child labor and 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1"Supply factors include the destruction of schools, the targeting of teachers and a decrease in the government budget 
for education, while demand factors include population displacement, youth enrollment in the military or rebel 
groups, limited mobility, changes in family structures (e.g. orphanhood), reduced life expectancy (affecting expected 
returns on human capital investment), increased poverty, and health and nutritional factors (affecting school 
performance and attendance). Justino (2010) and Buvinic et al. (2013) provide an overview."
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gender-discrimination. Third, post-war policies may vary, depending on type and amount of aid 
flows and on the capacity and nature of the post-war government in place.2  
The second set of reasons underlying the mixed evidence relates to the nature of the 
empirical analysis. Results may depend on the specific empirical model adopted as well as on the 
type and quality of the conflict intensity measures used, which can range from proxies such as 
dwelling destroyed to more detailed data on the number of battle events and human rights 
violations. Furthermore, the household survey data used in the analysis may or may not be 
representative at the national level or – more commonly – may not be representative across a 
number of characteristics, such as gender and separate income strata, or at the level of small 
administrative units.   
 This paper provides a contribution to the existing literature on conflict and education 
along both these dimensions. First, it provides novel evidence concerning the effects of armed 
conflicts and its underlying channels in the specific context of Rwanda, a country located in 
Africa’s turbulent Great Lakes Region and characterized by a long and complex conflict cycle in 
the nineties, which included the 1994 genocide, civil war in 1990-92 and 1994-98, revenge 
killings, (counter-)insurgency operations in 1994-98 and a massive refugee crisis, and in which 
an estimated 1,000,000 lives were lost. 3 Second, this paper provides insights into the role of the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2"The relevance of the specific setting at hand becomes apparent when considering for instance the two studies 
mentioned above that found an overall positive effect of armed conflict on education. Valente (2011), focusing on 
the Nepalese civil conflict, explains her finding of a (small) positive effect in terms of the relative low intensity of 
the conflict and of the strong position of the Maoist insurgence against gender-discriminating traditions, which 
brought an increase in women’s education. Arcand and Wouabe (2009) refer instead to the characteristics of the 
post-war labor market in Angola, with low wage for non-skilled labor and high expected returns to investment in 
education, to explain prolonged schooling of cohorts affected by the civil war."
3 It is estimated that the number of Tutsi killed during the genocide lies between 600,000 and 800,000, and that only 
25% to 30% of the Tutsi population survived the 1994 genocide (Prunier, 1998; Verpoorten, 2005). The genocide 
targeted also moderate Hutu and an unknown number of Hutu became victims of revenge killings, other forms of 
violence, or fell victim to diseases in refugee camps (Des Forges, 1999). It is likely that the total death toll of all 
events related to the conflict cycle in the nineties amounts to 1,000,000 (Verpoorten, 2012). Moroever, it is 
"
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data used and the applied empirical strategy, by performing a broad replication of another study 
that addressed the same research questions in the same setting, but using different data and 
empirical models.  
In particular, the paper starts with a replication of the widely cited study by Akresh and 
de Walque (2011) 4 - from now referred to as AdW. AdW find that the Rwandan conflict caused 
an 18.3% drop in primary schooling, with the drop being stronger for boys and non-poor than for 
girls and poor. They attribute the drop in schooling to the genocide, by showing that the drop 
was more severe in regions where the genocide was more intense. In our replication of AdW, we 
introduce three main changes to the analysis. First, we make use of a larger dataset. Whereas 
AdW rely on two waves of Demographic and Health household Surveys (DHS, 1992 and 2000), 
we use two waves of population census data (1991 and 2002). Both data sources bracket the 
main conflict events in Rwanda, but whereas the DHS is representative at the province level, the 
census data is representative for much smaller administrative units, for different income strata, 
age groups, and across gender. Secondly, in contrast to AdW, we include all constitutive 
components of the interaction terms when studying the heterogeneous impact across gender and 
income. Finally, we use finer conflict measures, at the level of 145 administrative communes 
instead of the 11 provinces. Our results confirm a large overall negative impact on schooling, but 
not its variation across gender and income strata. Also contrary to AdW, our results indicate that 
the drop in schooling cannot be attributed to the localized impact of the genocide.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
estimated that approximately 2 million people were displaced, and the transitional justice system for genocide 
suspects led to the imprisonment of more than 100,000 civilians. 
4 According to Google Scholar, as of January 2014, the 2008 version of Akresh and de Walque’s working paper was 
cited 118 times. The paper exists as an IZA discussion paper (IZA DP No. 3516, 2008), a World Bank Policy 
Research Paper (WPS4606, 2008), and a Households in Conflict Network Paper (HiCN Working Paper 47, 2008). 
The version we refer to is the latest update that is available on the personal website of Richard Akresh, dated 
February 2011. 
5"
"
Besides the broad replication of AdW, we provide two novel pieces of evidence. First, 
thanks to the rich data at our disposal, we are able to study for the first time the different impact 
of conflict on primary and secondary schooling, and the relative importance of three channels 
underlying this impact, i.e. school initiation, grade progression and drop-outs. Second, carefully 
investigating the reasons underlying the spatial mismatch between commune-level genocide 
intensity and the drop in schooling, we argue that the impact of armed conflict on schooling in 
Rwanda was nationwide, both because the disruption caused by the genocide was felt in every 
corner of the country and because - besides the genocide - other forms of violence took place in 
Rwanda in the nineties. 
In the next section, we demonstrate the reliability of the Rwandan population census data, 
by showing that the census provides an exact match with population data from another source, 
and that the basic result of AdW - an 18.3% drop in schooling - can be replicated almost 
perfectly. Section 3 looks at the variation of the estimated drop across income and gender, 
providing evidence. In Section 4 we study the sensitivity of our results across the choice of age 
groups and quantify the drop in primary versus secondary schooling. Section 5 examines the 
relative role of school initiation, slow grade progression and dropouts. In Section 6 we 
demonstrate that the spatial distribution of the drop in schooling cannot be attributed to the 
localized effects of the 1994 genocide. Sections 7 and 8 investigate why this is the case. Section 
9 concludes. 
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2. The reliability of the Rwandan population census data and the 
replication of the basic result of AdW   
 
The DHS is firmly established in empirical research as a reliable source of information, mainly 
because of its standard and transparent approaches for data collection, cleaning and coding. In 
contrast, population census data do not enjoy a good reputation because the collection method 
and practice vary across countries and census definitions of citizenship and ethnicity are often 
highly politicized. In the case of Rwanda, ethnicity is indeed politicized, which is reflected in the 
omission of ethnic identity in the 2002 population census, in line with the public rhetoric of 
national unity after the 1994 genocide. But, leaving ethnicity aside, the Rwandan census data 
turns out to be very reliable. Comparing the 1991 Rwandan census data with 1990 population 
data from the local administration, Verpoorten (2005) finds an almost exact match of the total 
number of women and men, which is indicative for the quality of both sources, as they were 
collected independently of each other.  
Another finding in support of the reliability of the Rwandan census is that, when  
replicating AdW with census data instead of DHS data, we find very similar estimates for the 
overall impact of conflict on schooling, as well as for the coefficients on the control variables.  
AdW study years of schooling of a young (6-15) and an older (16-35) age cohort in the 
1992 and 2000 DHS survey, and conclude that children exposed to armed conflict completed 
close to one-half year less education, corresponding to a 18.3% drop relative to the average 
educational achievement. For the replication of this result, we use the same empirical set-up, 
which consists of a difference-in-difference (DD) estimation. The young age cohort in 2000 
represents the treatment group, as they were exposed to conflict at schooling age. The DD model 
can be written as follows: 
7"
"
Yipt= α0 + α1 (postwart * youngip)+ α2 postwart + α3 youngi +εitp   (1) 
where Yit indicates the years of schooling of individual i living in province p at time t, postwar is 
an indicator variable for being in the post-conflict round, young is an indicator variable for being 
in the young age cohort and ε is the error term. A negative (positive) estimate of the DD 
coefficient, α1 indicates that the young cohort in the post-conflict era completed less (more) years 
of schooling, compared to the young cohort in the pre-conflict era and relative to the difference 
in schooling between the old cohorts over the same period.  
The DD model can be estimated using the 1991 and 2000 DHS data, which provide 
18,314 and 27,086 observations, respectively, in the age cohort 6-35. Doing so, AdW find a DD 
estimator equal to -0.555, significant at the 1 percent level (column 1 of Table 2, below). In a 
narrow replication using DHS data we obtain a very similar point estimate of -0.504, significant 
at 1% (column 2). 5  
Using a 10% random draw of the 1991 and 2002 censuses, gives a much larger number of 
observations; 441,870 and 464,741, respectively, for the age cohort 6-35.6  Repeating the 
estimation using these data we obtain a point estimate of -0.573, corresponding to a 16.2% drop 
in years of schooling (column 3).7 This estimate is very close to the AdW result, despite slightly 
different sample years.  
In the next step, we follow AdW by expanding equation (1) to include household level 
controls as well as province and age fixed effects: 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5"Replication data and command files for AdW are not publicly available (yet). We therefore constructed the 
replication materials using the DHS survey and the information provided by AdW in their paper."
6 The 10% draw of the 1991 census is made available by Minnesota Population Center (2010). The same source also 
provides access to a 10% draw of the 2002 census, but this sample does not include the names of the administrative 
sectors. We therefore take a new 10% random draw directly from the full 2002 census at our disposal. Results 
remain qualitatively the same when considering the full census.  
7 The proportional change in schooling is derived as the DD estimate when the dependent variable equals the natural 
logarithm of years of schooling.  
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Yitp= β0 + β 1 (postwart * youngip)+ β 2 postwart + β 3 youngip +XipΔ + ηi +πp + εitp (2) 
where ηi and πp  represent the age and province fixed effects, respectively, and X is a vector that 
includes the same household level controls as AdW: an indicator variable for female, for non-
poor households8, the age of the household head, the highest education level of any household 
member, the number of children under 5 living in the household, and an indicator variable for 
rural areas.  
The DD estimate of the augmented empirical equation reported by AdW is -0.421, 
significant at 1% (column 4). In our narrow replication using DHS data we find a similar 
coefficient, equal to -0.494 (column 5). The broad replication using census data yields an 
estimate of -0.649 (column 6). In proportional terms, this latter figure amounts to a drop of 
18.4%, which matches almost perfectly the 18.3% estimate of AdW, obtained through the DHS 
data.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the DHS and census variables used in the 
analysis.  
---- Table 1 about here ---- 
Figure 1 visualizes the comparison between the two sources, giving the average years of 
schooling by age in both the pre- and post- conflict rounds for the DHS (panel A) and for the 
census (panel B) data. The figures are very similar. The old age cohorts display, on average, 
systematically higher years of schooling in the post-conflict era compared to the pre-conflict era, 
suggesting that before the explosion of the violence there was a positive trend in schooling in 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8 The indicator variable non-poor indicates if the individual has more assets than the population mean. The assets 
include piped running water, refrigerator, radio, finished floor, bicycle, motorcycle, and car (AdW, 2011).  
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Rwanda. In contrast, and in line with the DD estimate, educational attainment of the younger 
cohorts is lower in the post-conflict era, compared to the pre-conflict era.  
---- Figure 1 about here ---- 
In sum, the analysis presented in this section confirms the main result of AdW of a large 
drop in schooling and demonstrates that the DD estimates are very similar across the DHS and 
census data. In addition, as Table 2 clearly reveals, the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables are also similar. This is an indication for the reliability of the census data and lends 
support to their use in our exploration of the channels that account for the schooling deficit. 
---- Table 2 about here ---- 
 
3. Leveling-off versus no leveling-off 
 
We now shift our focus from exploring the overall effect of conflict on schooling to studying the 
heterogeneity of the effect across wealth and gender. To evaluate whether conflict affects years 
of education differently across the poor and non-poor and across boys and girls in the DHS 
samples, AdW rely on a Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff (DDD) strategy, adding a three-way interaction 
term to equation (2), in which the treated group (young age cohort in the 2000 DHS) is interacted 
either with a household-level indicator variable for being non-poor (non-poor*young*postwar) 
or with an individual-level indicator variable for being a female (female*young*postwar). The 
DDD coefficient on the triple interaction term should reveal whether the drop in schooling for 
the young cohort in the post-conflict era has been relatively larger or smaller for children in non-
poor households and for girls. In order to obtain unbiased estimates, however, all the constitutive 
components of the triple interaction should be included in the regression. In their specification, 
10"
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AdW left out some of these components, obtaining misleading estimates for the DDD 
coefficients. 9 
 
(a) Non-poor versus poor 
 
Table 3 reports the results when the triple interaction with the non-poor variable is added 
to the regression. In their paper AdW find a large, negative and strongly significant estimate of   
-1.223 on the three-way interaction term (column 1), which leads them to conclude that the drop 
in schooling is stronger for the children in non-poor households. We can replicate this result 
almost exactly using the DHS data, provided that we omit the constitutive terms non-poor*young 
and non-poor*postwar (results not reported). When including these terms, however, we obtain 
an estimated coefficient of -0.399 (column 2), indicating a much smaller additional negative 
impact on schooling for the non-poor. Moreover, in our broad replication using the richer census 
data, the estimated DDD drops to -0.018 and is no longer significantly different from zero 
(column 3).  
---- Table 3 about here ---- 
However, in addition to the exclusion of some constitutive terms and the limited 
representativeness of the DHS dataset, there is an endogeneity problem affecting these estimates, 
as poverty may itself be a determinant of conflict intensity or the non-poor may be characterized 
by different trends in pre-conflict schooling. To solve for the endogeneity one would need to 
employ a rich set of control variables and/or a valid instrument - both of which are in short 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9 That all constitutive components of interaction terms need to be included is pointed out among others by Brambor 
et al. (2006), who write: "No matter what form the interaction term takes, all constitutive terms should be included. 
Thus, […] X,Z, J, XZ, XJ, and ZJ should be included when the interaction term is XZJ. Although the statistics (and 
political science) literature is clear that all constitutive terms should be included, scholars often fall prey to the 
temptation to exclude one or more of them.” (p. 66)!
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supply. We will therefore not be able to provide a final answer to whether the armed conflict 
disproportionately affected poor households in terms of years of education. 
What we can do is highlight the need to qualify the results. Take for instance the different 
trends in schooling across urban and rural households, shown in Figure 2. Since the urban areas 
are home to many of the non-poor, these different trends are associated with different trends 
across poor and non-poor.10 When we run our regression including an indicator variable for 
urban communes11 and the full set of interaction terms urban*postwar, urban*young and 
urban*young*postwar, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term non-
poor*young*postwar, albeit of small magnitude, turns positive (column 4).  
---- Figure 2 about here ---- 
In sum, the result of AdW of a higher schooling deficit for non-poor fades away when 
adding the constitutive components of the interaction terms and using a more representative 
sample; and it is reverted when accounting for part of the non-randomness of poverty by 
including a set of control variables for urban trends. 
 
(b) Boys versus girls 
Conflict cannot turn boys into girls, or girls into boys; and boys and girls are not clustered in 
space. This makes it easier to study the heterogeneous impact of conflict across gender, as the 
three-way interaction term female*young*postwar can be interpreted unambiguously.  
Table 4 reports the results when the triple interaction with the female dummy is added to the 
regression. In this case AdW report a positive and strongly significant (at 1%) DDD estimate of 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10"Using the measure of poverty constructed by AdW, we find that 42% of people living in rural areas were non-poor 
in 1991, compared to 81% of people living in urban areas."
11 The urban indicator variable takes the value one for the communes of Kigali City, the provincial capitals and a 
number of other secondary urban centers. 
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0.219, suggesting that the impact of the conflict on the schooling of girls is less negative than the 
impact for boys, thus pointing to a leveling-off effect (as girls have on average a lower level of 
schooling). 
---- Table 4 ---- 
However, also in this case, two out of the three constitutive terms of the interaction effect are 
erroneously omitted (female*young and female*postwar). In a narrow replication on the basis of 
the DHS data and omitting the constitutive terms of the DDD we also find a positive and 
strongly significant coefficient (0.148, not reported). In a correct specification we estimate 
instead a  non-significant coefficient of -0.039 and, when using the richer census data, we obtain 
a significantly negative coefficient (at 1%) equal to -0.141, thus indicating an additional 
schooling deficit for girls.  
To be sure, we run the regressions on subsamples, for boys and girls separately. We find a 
DD estimate of -0.595 for boys and -0.705 for girls; indicating that the conflict led to a drop in 
schooling of 15.9% for boys, compared to a drop of 20.7% for girls (not reported). The result is 
very robust to changes in the age thresholds considered, but the magnitude of the coefficient 
decreases as we include older individuals in the young age cohort. This suggests that the 
additional negative effect of conflict on girls’ schooling is stronger for the youngest cohorts, but 
fades away when considering older individuals. This is confirmed by Figure A1 (in appendix), in 
which we report the estimated DDD coefficient for each age, from 6 to 20. Exploring the reasons 
underlying this pattern goes beyond the scope of this paper, but this is a result that deserves 
further research.  
As the DDD estimate is unlikely to be affected by confounding factors, it should remain 
stable when adding the urban factors (urban*postwar, urban*young and urban*young*postwar). 
13"
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We indeed find that when adding these terms, the estimated DDD coefficient is virtually 
unchanged, switching from -0.141 to -0.149.  
In sum, the result of AdW of a higher schooling deficit for boys is reverted when adding the 
constitutive components of the interaction terms. Our findings point to an additional negative 
conflict impact on the schooling of girls. 
 
4. Alternative age cohorts and the drop in secondary schooling 
 
So far, we have considered the age group 16-35 as a control group for studying the impact of 
conflict on the young cohort 6-15. Doing so, we follow the baseline specification of AdW. There 
are however two issues related to this approach.  
First, strictly speaking, the age groups used in our broad replication are not a one-to-one 
match with those of AdW. One could argue that a closer match to the age cohort used in AdW is 
the age cohort 8-37 in the 2002 census, since individuals aged 8-37 in 2002 were aged 6-35 in 
2000, the DHS survey year. We therefore repeat our broad replication of the main result obtained 
by AdW (and reported in Table 2) using the age cohort 8-17 as the young cohort and 18-37 as 
the old cohort. The results, shown in Table 5, are qualitatively the same to our baseline 
specification (reported in column 1), but quantitatively larger, with a DD estimate of -0.919 for 
equation (2), corresponding to a 21.1% drop in years of schooling.  
---- Table 5 about here ---- 
The larger coefficient obtained with this “older young cohort” hints to the second issue 
related to the cut-off ages, i.e. the old age cohorts considered so far are imperfect control groups, 
as they include individuals that were still at schooling age when the genocide broke out. For 
instance, individuals aged 16 to 22 in 2002 were aged 8 to 14 in 1994. Their schooling 
14"
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attainment may therefore have been affected by the conflict.12 This is clear from Figure 1, which 
shows that, on average, years of schooling in 2002 are lower than in 1991 for individuals up to 
22 years old. When repeating our estimation using the expanded young age cohort 6 to 22 (and 
contracted old age cohort 23-35), we find a larger drop in years of schooling of -1.176, 
corresponding to a proportional decrease of 24.8% (Column 3 of Table 5). 
The expanded young age cohort, 6-22, includes individuals at both primary and 
secondary schooling age. To pin down the different effect of conflict across primary and 
secondary school, we run two separate regressions for individuals at primary and secondary 
schooling age. To demarcate primary and secondary schooling age,  we rely on information from 
the 1991 census, displayed in Figure 3. The figure shows that most students up to the age of 13 
are attending primary school, while from age 14 onwards most students attend secondary school. 
We therefore use the young cohort 6-13 to approximate the impact on primary schooling 
(excluding the age group 14-22), and we use the young cohort 14-22 to approximate the impact 
on secondary schooling (excluding the age group 6-13).13 In both cases, 23-35 acts as a control 
group. Column 4 and 5 of Table 5 show that we obtain a DD estimate of -1.104 and -1.073 
respectively, corresponding to a drop of 27.5% in the years of primary schooling and a drop of 
17.4% in the years of secondary schooling.  
---- Figure 3 about here ---- 
In sum, this section indicates that the overall drop in primary schooling caused by the 
armed conflict is likely to be considerably larger than originally thought, increasing from 18.4% 
to 27.5% when the cut-off ages are adjusted to take into account that children at secondary 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12 According to the 1991 census, 39% of the children aged 8 to 14 were enrolled in school in Rwanda. 
13"In 1991, 99% of the students were under 23; the age group 6-13 represented more than 92% of the student 
population enrolled in primary school, while the age group 14-22 represented 73% of the student population enrolled 
in secondary school. 
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schooling age also suffered a drop in schooling due to the conflicts. We also find that the drop in 
secondary schooling has been large, although not as large as the drop in primary schooling. 
Even though these results indicate that the age cohort 16-35 is not the best choice as a 
control group, we will keep using so to allow direct comparison with AdW. Given this choice, 
our estimated effect of conflict on schooling attainments should be considered as a lower bound. 
In a series of robustness checks we re-run all our regressions using the cohorts 8-17 and 6-22 as 
young age cohorts. We find that all our results - including those presented in the previous 
chapter, concerning the leveling-off hypothesis - remain in a qualitative sense, except in few 
cases, which we will highlight in the text. 
 
5. School initiation, drop-out or slow grade progression?  
 
The drop in schooling attainment can be due to children that do not initiate school (H1), children 
that drop out of school (H2), or children that slowly progress through grades (H3). 14 We 
investigate the relative importance of these channels on the basis of information on the past and 
present schooling status of the individuals in the census, i.e. whether he or she has ever attended 
school (everbeentoschool) and whether he or she still is a student (student).15  
We first produce a set of simple figures. Figure 4a displays the shares of individuals who 
ever attended school by age and year. Compared to 1991, individuals of all ages in 2002 were 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 AdW investigate the role of school initiation (H1) by studying grade completion separately for grades 1 to 6. They 
find that first-grade completion is very similar across 1992 and 2000 and conclude that the estimated schooling 
deficit is not so much caused by a lack of access to education, but rather by difficulties to continue attending school 
and to progress through grades. However, AdW do not empirically explore the relative contribution of dropouts 
(H2) and grade repetition (H3). 
15"More precisely, census data record the years of schooling a person has completed and whether he or she is 
currently studying. We therefore assume that a person has been to primary school if he or she is currently a student 
or, alternatively, if he or she has completed at least one year of school."
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more likely to have ever attended school, indicating that primary school initiation (H1) is not a 
major issue. Figure 4b gives information on dropouts, displaying the share of individuals aged 14 
or above that completed all six grades of primary school, among the population that started 
primary school but that is no longer enrolled there. The figure shows that, in the census year after 
the conflict, more students dropped out before completing primary education, providing support 
for (H2). Finally, if slow grade progression (H3) is among the causes of the observed drop in 
schooling, we should find that students in 2002 are older than students in 1991, conditional on 
the grade they attend. This is shown in Figure 4c, which gives the average age of students across 
twelve different grades. The average age of students is higher in 2002 than in 1991 for each of 
the six primary grades (1-6) and across the three years of lower secondary schooling (7-9), but 
not for upper secondary schooling (grades 10-12). For instance, students who attend the final 
grade of primary school (i.e. who already completed 5 years of schooling) are on average 14.7 
years old in 2002 compared to 12.5 in 1991.  
---- Figure 4 about here ---- 
Combined, these figures suggest that drop-outs (H2) as well as grade repetition (H3) are 
driving the result of a decrease in primary schooling, while primary school initiation (H1) is not 
a major issue. We study this more formally.  
First, focusing on school initiation (H1), we repeat the estimation of equation (2) when 
replacing years of schooling with everbeentoschool as a dependent variable.16 The first column 
of Panel A of Table 6 shows that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term young*T is 
negative and significant, but small, indicating that the young cohort in 2002 was 2.3 percentage 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
16 Although this variable is binary, we keep the linear estimation model, because it is more traceable and any 
possible bias will be small given the large number of observations. Results are confirmed when using a Probit model 
(not reported). 
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points less likely to enroll in primary school, compared to the older cohort in 2002 and relative to 
the difference between the young and old cohort in 1991 (the average enrolment rate in the 
sample is 68.2%). 17  
To study whether dropouts (H2) played a role, we take primary school completion as our 
dependent variable. Focusing on those individuals that ever attended school, but are no longer 
enrolled in primary school, we redefine the young cohort as those aged 14 to 22 and the old 
cohort as those aged 23-35.18 The estimate reported in the second column of Panel A of Table 6 
is again negative and significant, but this time of sizeable magnitude: in 2002, former students in 
the young age cohort were 28.1 percentage points less likely to have completed primary school,  
compared to the older cohort in 2002 and relative to the difference between the young and old 
cohort in 1991 (average primary completion rate in the sample is 54.8%). 
---- Table 6 about here ---- 
 To study the case of slow progress (H3), we restrict our analysis to individuals enrolled 
in grades 1-6, and to the age group 10-18 because information on student status is available only 
from age 10 onwards, and because above age 18 there are very few primary school students.19 
We introduce an individual’s age as the dependent variable in the following equation: 
Aitg= δ0 + δ 1 postwart+ XiΨ + Γg +π’p + µitp      (3) 
where the terms Aitg and Γg indicate the age of child i at time t in grade g, and grade fixed effects, 
respectively. The coefficient of interest is δ 1. It indicates whether, for a given grade, students are 
on average older in the post-war population than in the pre-war population. Our estimated 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
17 When using the alternative young age cohorts 8-17 the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
18 According to the 1991 census, 93% of the students enrolled in primary school were younger than 14. Results are 
in any case very robust to small changes in the definition of the cohorts. 
19 According to the census rounds, the share of individuals over 18 attending primary school is less than 0.5% in 
1991 and less than 2% in 2002. Once again, results are very robust to small changes in the age thresholds. 
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coefficient of 1.694 provides clear evidence for slow grade progression: on average students in 
2002 were over one and a half years older than students in the same grade in 1991.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results for secondary schooling. In sharp contrast to 
primary schooling, but in line with the patterns in Figures 4a, 4b and 4c, the results indicate that 
school initiation is the most salient factor explaining the drop in secondary schooling.20 In 
column 1 only individuals that completed primary school are considered. The coefficient 
indicates that, in 2002, individuals in the age cohort 14-22 21 were 28.5 percentage points less 
likely to complete the first year of secondary school compared to the same cohort in 1991 
(average secondary school enrolment in the sample is 59.7%). On a positive note, results in the 
second column indicate that those who started secondary schooling were not less likely to finish 
it (if anything, they were more likely to do so), and this despite evidence for a slightly slower 
grade progression (column 3).22 One possible explanation for this result is that  the selection of 
students that did enroll into secondary school after the conflict was biased towards the relatively 
more motivated and able. 
In order to test whether these channels operate similarly for boys and girls, we add to our 
regression the interactions with the female dummy. Results reported in Table A1 in Appendix 
reveal that our previous conclusions on the relative importance of the three factors hold for both 
boys and girls: slow grade progression and high dropout rates are the major factors leading to the 
drop in primary schooling, while a lower enrolment drives the result for secondary schooling. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
20"As the census only records the years of schooling completed by each individual, along with his or her current 
student status, we define our enrolment variable as taking value 1 if either the person has completed at least one year 
of secondary school, or if he or she has completed primary schooling and is currently a student. 
21 See Section 3 for a justification of the choice of the 14-22 age category.  
22 We choose 18 as the lower limit because according to both the 1991 and 2002 census virtually nobody completed 
secondary schooling before that age. The choice of the upper limit of 26 is more arbitrary. In any case, less than 
0.5% of individuals enrolled in secondary school in 1991 were above 26. Results are very robust to small changes in 
the definition of the upper limit. 
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However, although the overall picture holds, there are some noteworthy differences. First, the 
(small) drop in primary school enrolment that we observed above is mostly driven by a drop in 
the enrolment of girls. Second, compared to boys, girls suffer a significantly higher dropout rate 
during primary school. There is however no indication of slower grade progression for girls. 
Moreover, conditional on completing primary school, girls are somewhat more likely to enroll in 
secondary school than boys, even if they then suffer a slightly higher dropout rate from 
secondary school.  
 
6. Attribution to genocide: contrasting findings 
 
Among the events in Rwanda’s conflict cycle of the nineties - civil war, genocide, revenge 
killings, (counter-)insurgency operations and a massive refugee crisis - the genocide stood out 
with a death toll of close to 800,000 in barely 100 days (between April and July 1994). AdW test 
whether the drop in schooling can be attributed to the genocide by estimating a DDD model in 
which the treatment group (young age cohort in the post-war round) is interacted with a measure 
of genocide intensity. In other words, they augment equation (2) with the term 
postwar*young*genocide_intensity, this time including all its constitutive components.  
AdW consider three different genocide intensity measures defined at the level of 11 
provinces: the proportion of days during which killings occurred in a province in the months 
April-June 1994 (Measure A), an indicator variable taking one for the three provinces with the 
highest number of killings in 1994 (Measure B), and the number of mass graves and memorials 
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per province (Measure C).23 The DDD estimates obtained by AdW – reported in Panel A of 
Table 7 - are all negative and significant at the 10% level, pointing to a significantly stronger 
negative impact on schooling in provinces where the genocide intensity was higher.  
We cannot replicate these results. As Panel B of Table 7 shows, in our narrow replication, 
using the same data, variables and specification, we obtain very different coefficients. It is not 
clear what accounts for these differences.24 Estimates are also very different when we estimate 
the DDD model using the population census data, with the coefficients turning all close to zero 
(Panel C).  
---- Table 7 about here ---- 
In an attempt to address the potential endogeneity of genocide intensity, AdW perform an 
IV estimation. Using the province-level distance to the Ugandan border as an instrument, AdW 
report IV coefficients that are in line with their OLS results. Once again, we obtain very different 
results – mostly not statistically significant - both in our narrow and in our broad replication.25  
Leaving aside the comparison with the results of AdW, our failure to establish a link 
between the drop in schooling and the genocide may be due to the fact that the conflict intensity 
measures considered so far are all defined at the province level and may be too crude to properly 
capture variation in genocide intensity. We address this issue by turning to four finer measures, 
defined at the level of the 145 administrative communes: the proportion of Tutsi in the pre-war 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
23 Measure A and B are taken from the genodynamics project (Davenport and Stam, 2009); measure C is taken from 
the Yale Genocide Studies website (http://www.yale.edu/gsp/rwanda/) 
24 Dropping the province fixed effects, or the constitutive components - one by one, or in pairs – does not bring the 
replication results closer to the results presented by AdW. 
25 Results are available on request. We do not discuss them in detail because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to 
hold. To defend the choice for the instrument, AdW argue that the southern provinces located further from the 
border with Uganda were more likely to experience high conflict intensity because they were reached later by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, which brought an end to the killings of Tutsi. Although this instrument is relevant, i.e. it is 
sufficiently correlated with 1994 killings, it is unlikely to be exogenous, as the southern part of the country was also 
characterized by a higher concentration of Tutsi, which traditionally enjoyed higher levels of education (see also our 
discussion in Section 7). 
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population, the share of genocide suspects, the number of mass graves, and the distance to the 
nearest mass grave calculated from the commune centroid.26 Table 8 reports the estimates: none 
of the measures yields a DDD that is significantly different from zero and of the expected 
negative sign.27  
---- Table 8 about here ---- 
In sum, the DDD model does not attribute the observed drop in schooling to the 
genocide, even when using finer genocide intensity measure and a larger and more representative 
dataset. This is also confirmed in a subsample analysis. The last two rows of Table 8 report the 
estimated DD coefficient when equation (2) is run on a restricted sample, considering only 
communes that have a value above or below the median for each one of the four different 
conflict variables. The estimated DD coefficients are always very similar across the two 
subsamples.  
The mismatch between the drop in schooling and genocide intensity is also clear from 
Figure 5, in which we compare the distribution of the commune-level DD estimates obtained by 
estimating equation 1 for each commune j separately (figure 5a) to the distribution of the share of 
Tutsi living in each commune in 1991 (figure 5b). For instance, since the share of Tutsi in the 
northwestern provinces was as low as 1.5% (compared to over 10% in the South), it is unlikely 
that the large estimated drop in schooling in the Northwest is due to the genocide. The spatial 
mismatch also holds for each of the other conflict proxies (see Figure A2 in Appendix). 
---- Figure 5 about here ---- 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
26 The first of these measures is calculated from the 1991 Rwandan population census, the second from the records 
of the Gacaca (the transitional justice system for genocide suspects), and the latter two from a map taken from the 
Yale Genocide Studies website. 
27 We also repeat our regressions instrumenting the conflict variables (and their interactions) with the commune-
level (log) distance to the border with Uganda. The qualitative results remain the same (not reported). Finally, we 
repeat the regression including commune fixed effects to limit the likelihood of bias stemming from omitted time-
invariant factors, and find again similar results (not reported). 
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7. Why can’t we attribute the drop in schooling to genocide?  
 
7.1. A more general regional or national time trend 
One possible explanation for the mismatch is that the drop in schooling picked up by the DD 
model is unrelated to genocide and is instead simply driven by a time trend. In order to test for 
this possibility AdW compare the trends in schooling in Rwanda in the nineties with those in 
neighboring countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). They demonstrate that years of schooling 
consistently increased for the Rwandan neighbors, indicating that the observed drop in Rwanda 
cannot be accounted for by regional events or regional time trends.  
We performe another falsification test to verify whether a longstanding national time 
trend is driving our results. We estimate the DD model for two older cohorts of individuals, 
unlikely to be exposed to armed conflict at schooling age, i.e. 25-40 and 41-60. The DD 
coefficient, estimated at -0.017, is not significantly different from zero (not reported), indicating 
that our results cannot be due to a pre-existing time trend in education. 
 
7.2. Confounding factors 
Could the failure to establish a direct link between the drop in schooling and the intensity of the 
genocide be due to the presence of confounding factors that bias our DDD estimates? We can 
think of four such factors: pre-war regional trends in schooling, migration, selective killings 
during the genocide and post-war assistance to genocide survivors.28  
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
28"Once again, for ease of exposition, in what follows we only discuss results in which we consider the share of Tutsi 
living in the commune in 1991 as the proxy for genocide intensity, but results are similar whenever one of the 
alternative proxies is considered (not reported, but available on request)."
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(a) Pre-war regional time trends in schooling  
The DDD takes the pre-war trend across young and old as a counterfactual, implicitly assuming 
that conflict intensity does not correlate with pre-war trends in schooling. This assumption is 
violated if both conflict and schooling trends are affected by a common factor. One such factor 
may be the identity of the political leader.29 In Rwanda, prior to independence, the Tutsi elite 
was dominating and the areas around the capital of the Tutsi monarchy (Nyanza, located on the 
intersection of Gitarama and Butare) were flourishing. The ethnicity of the leader changed from 
Tutsi to Hutu in 1959, and discrimination against Tutsi increased, especially during the 
Habyarimana regime (1973-1994), when favors were directed to the core of Habyarimana’s 
supporters, residing in the provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, in the Northwest of the country 
(Des Forges, 1999).30 
Clientelism and switching powers may therefore account for pre-war differences in 
schooling trends across the country.31 To check whether these pre-war trends are confounding 
our DDD results, we exploit the large size of our dataset and add a complete set of province 
trends and province interaction terms to the DDD regression model (i.e. for each province p we 
create the indicator variable provincep and we add the terms provincep*young*postwar, 
provincep*young, provincep*postwar to the regression). Panel A of Table 9 reports the results: 
the DDD estimate remains statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
29 Kudamatsu (2009) and Franck and Rainer (2012), among others, show that there is a strong link between the 
identity of political leaders and the development of the regions that are favored by them. 
30 About Habyarimana’s political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Dévelopment (MRND) 
Des Forges (1999, p.45) writes: “…the MRND had regulated access to government-supported high schools, 
supposedly assigning places according to quotas for ethnic and regional groups. The quotas were both inaccurately 
computed and unfairly applied, favoring children from the Northwest or those whose families could pay in money or 
other benefits for access to education.” 
31 Figure A3 in Appendix shows that whereas individuals in the old age cohort in Butare and Gitarama had higher 
schooling in 1991 than their counterparts in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, the difference is minimal for the young cohort 
in 1991. This pattern is consistent with a catch-up of schooling in the stronghold of the Habyarimana regime. The 
pattern remains even when removing Tutsi from the sample, suggesting that - besides ethnicity - regionalism played 
a role. 
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(b) Migration 
Armed conflicts are often associated with large migration flows, both during the conflict and in 
its aftermath. If especially highly educated adults moved out of the most affected communes, the 
gap between the young and old cohort remaining in those communes would be reduced, thus 
biasing our DDD estimate towards zero.32 
The census data include information on place of birth, previous residence, current 
residence and time at current residence, allowing us to trace an individual’s migration history. To 
gauge whether migration is causing a bias we assign all individuals who moved between 1994 
and 2002 - representing 21.7% of the 2002 sample - to their previous commune of residence and 
we re-estimate the DDD model.33 The results, reported in Panel B of Table 9, show that the DDD 
coefficient remains (positive and) statistically insignificant.34 
---- Table 9 about here ---- 
(c) Selective killings  
de Walque and Verwimp (2009) demonstrate that the probability of being killed in the genocide 
was relatively higher for men, for the well-educated and for Tutsi, and was highest among the 
well-educated Tutsi male population. Figure 6 shows that Tutsi had on average more years of 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
32 Figure A4 in Appendix shows that adults who migrated between 1994 and 2002 had on average higher levels of 
education compared to non-migrants."
33"The sample size is reduced because individuals that previously lived abroad are dropped from the sample. It is 
also important to mention that this test is complicated by the fact that in 2001 Rwanda underwent a large 
administrative reform that transformed its 145 communes into 106 districts. The 2002 census only provides previous 
district of residence. For those districts that overlap with different communes we arbitrarily assign the individual to 
one of the communes. Results are however robust to alternative assignments to the previous communes, to dropping 
all migrants, and to only re-assigning migrants from one of the 20 districts that perfectly match with previous 
communes (results not reported, but available on request)."
34 We cannot account for individuals who migrated outside Rwanda after the genocide and did not return, as they are 
not included in the 2002 census. The magnitude of the potential bias introduced by these non-returnees is however 
small. As it will be better explained in chapter 8, the large majority of individuals that fled Rwanda in 1994 were 
refugees that sought repair in the refugee camps set up in the neighboring countries, which closed in the course of 
1996-1998 generating a massive flow of returnees, as reported, among others, by the Red Cross (Merkelbach, 2000). 
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schooling than Hutu in 1991. The targeted killing of Tutsi adults would thus bias downward our 
DD and DDD estimates, since it would reduce the gap between the schooling of the young and 
old age cohorts in the post-war population, and especially so in the provinces and communes 
with high genocide intensity. 
---- Figure 6 about here ---- 
As it has been estimated that approximately 75% of Tutsi were killed during the 
genocide, we gauge the magnitude of the bias by re-running our estimations after randomly 
removing 75% of Tutsi from the 1991 population, i.e. after artificially introducing in the 1991 
census a selection similar to the one caused by the genocide in 1994. This artificial manipulation 
of the sample, which results in the loss of around 3% of the overall observations, pushes the 
DDD coefficient down to -0.042, but leaves it statistically insignificant (Panel C of Table 9). 
Moreover, the large and significant coefficient of the two-way interaction term (young*postwar) 
remains, indicating that the localized effects of the genocide cannot fully account for the drop in 
schooling, even when controlling for the selective aspect of the killings.35  
 
(d) Post-war assistance to genocide survivors  
In the aftermath of the conflict, many assistance programs for genocide survivors were launched. 
For instance, the FARG (Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide) supports genocide 
survivors with allowances, health insurance, housing and school fees, among others. According 
to the information provided on the FARG website (www.farg.gov.rw), four years after the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
35"A stronger test would be to drop the 75% best educated Tutsi from the old age cohort, instead of a random 
sample. Doing so results in a negative and significant (at 1%) DDD coefficient of -0.696 (not reported), indicating 
that the selective aspect of the killings has the potential to mask the link between genocide intensity and the drop in 
schooling. However, it still cannot account for the large overall drop in schooling, because the DDD remains 
quantitatively small (the average share of Tutsi in the sample is equal to 0.11) and, above all, because the large and 
significant coefficient of the two-way interaction term (young*postwar) remains virtually unaffected.  
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genocide FARG was already awarding scholarships for secondary schooling to 24,000 students, 
which is a sizeable share of genocide survivors at schooling age.36 Even in the absence of 
detailed data on the other forms of support, this figures is suggestive of the large amount of 
resources mobilized to support genocide survivors.37  
The support received by genocide survivors may confound the link between the intensity 
of the genocide and the drop in schooling. Figure 7 illustrates why this could be the case. 
Relying on data from a nationally representative survey collected in 1999/2000 (EICV1), the 
figure shows a markedly positive relationship between the share of students that report enjoying 
a scholarship in 2000 and the province-level share of Tutsi in the pre-war population.38 The 
strong link between the scholarship program and the genocide is also underscored by the fact that 
most of its beneficiaries (63%) are paternal orphans.39  
---- Figure 7 about here ---- 
But, is the scholarship program important enough to confound our DDD result? It can 
bias the DDD estimate to zero if it sufficiently drives up years of education of the young cohort. 
We cannot directly test this because the census does not provide information on scholarships, but 
we can get an idea about the maximum possible bias induced by the scholarship program by 
removing from the young age cohort of each province a share of the best educated children, 
equal to the province-level share of children that received a scholarship according to the EICV1 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
36 It has been estimated that in total 300,000 Tutsi survived (Prunier, 1998) – among which about 20% would have 
been at secondary schooling age in 1998.  
37 Although the scholarship program of the FARG targets secondary schooling, the foresight of access to secondary 
schooling may positively affect the decision to send children to primary school. Besides, primary schooling may be 
funded by the cash allowances, which amounted to RWF 5000 monthly, and were received by about 30,000 people 
in 2011 (www.farg.gov.rw). 
38"The relationship holds for students in different age groups, e.g. 6-35, 6-15 and 16-35."
39"The channeling of scholarships to genocide orphans could account for an apparently surprising finding in the data, 
i.e. the smaller difference in schooling between orphans and non-orphans in provinces with a high share of Tutsi, 
compared to provinces with a low shares of Tutsi (see Figure A5 in Appendix)."
27"
"
data. For instance, since 14% of students are reported to receive a scholarship in Gitarama 
province, compared to 5% in Gisenyi province, we drop from our sample 14% of the best 
educated children in the young cohort in Gitarama province and 5% in Gisenyi province. Doing 
so for each province, we find that the DDD coefficient declines to -0.230, but remains 
statistically insignificant (Panel D of Table 9). We can therefore conclude that the potential bias 
induced by the program cannot account for the statistical mismatch between genocide intensity 
and the drop in schooling.40 
 
8. The puzzle remains: what accounts for the large drop in schooling?  
 
When accounting for potentially confounding factors, the DDD estimate changes, but remains 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, the coefficient of the two-way interaction 
term young*postwar remains remarkably stable across all the tests we performed. The puzzle 
thus remains: we cannot attribute the large drop in schooling to the localized effect of the 
genocide. In this section we dig deeper into this puzzle, investigating whether the drop in 
schooling is driven by other specific forms of violence that affected Rwanda in the nineties. 
After excluding this possibility, we shift our attention to the relationship between the drop in 
schooling and external displacement. In this case we find that the drop in schooling can be at 
least partly explained by the fact that a high number of individuals abandoned Rwanda to seek 
temporary refuge in one of the many camps set up in the neighboring Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Tanzania or Burundi. Importantly, the spatial distribution of the externally 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
40 Results are robust to excluding from the analysis all paternal orphans. The DDD coefficient only turns negative 
and significant when considering the young age cohort 6-22. However, also in that case the coefficient of the 
interaction young*postwar remains very stable, large, negative and significant at 1%. 
28"
"
displacement households is not correlated with any specific form of violence. Hence, in the 
concluding section we argue that the impact of armed conflict in Rwanda was nationwide; and 
we provide additional pieces of evidence in support of this conjecture.  
 
(a) Other forms of violence 
The 1994 genocide was extremely violent (around 800.000 victims), but short-lived (around 100 
days). Other less intense, but longer-lasting forms of violence took place in Rwanda during the 
nineties, including civil war, revenge killings, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations. 
Could it be that the drop in schooling picked up by the DD model is driven by these other 
events? To test this hypothesis, we rely on the scarcely available data on other forms of violence 
in Rwanda.  
The first dataset is taken from Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) and contains an index that 
records excess mortality caused by episodes of violence different from the genocide. The index 
was generated by relying on eleven excess mortality and conflict proxies calculated from the two 
waves of census data and the gacaca information round.41 The second dataset is based on the 
information contained in four Amnesty International Reports (1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998) and 
records the number of extrajudicial killings of civilians during the (counter)insurgency 
operations that took place till the late nineties in the Northwest of Rwanda. 42 While the first 
dataset has national coverage, the second dataset only contains information for the two provinces 
in the Northwest.  
Panel A and B of Table 10 report the results using these two alternative conflict proxies. The 
DDD estimates are negative, and in general statistically insignificant, turning significant only for 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
41 Principal component analysis was used to construct the indices. See Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) for details.! 
42"Verpoorten (2012) provides details on the compilation of this dataset."
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operations that took place till the late nineties in the Northwest of Rwanda. 43 While the first 
dataset has national coverage, the second dataset only contains information for the two provinces 
in the Northwest.  
Panel A and B of Table 10 report the results using these two alternative conflict proxies. The 
DDD estimates are negative, and in general statistically insignificant, turning significant only for 
certain cut-off ages.44 These results suggest that other forms of violence may partly account for 
the drop in schooling. However, the fact that the young*postwar coefficient remains negative, 
large and significant at 1%, indicates that the large drop in schooling remains mostly 
unexplained, also by other specific forms of violence.  
---- Table 10 about here ---- 
To further confirm this finding, we calculate DD estimates of the drop in schooling for each 
province and compare these with information on the type of violence (genocide, civil war or 
(counter-)insurgency) that dominated in each one of the 11 provinces during the nineties.45 Table 
11 shows that the DD coefficients are remarkably similar across the different provinces, showing 
no relationship between the drop in schooling and the predominance of any specific form of 
violence.  
---- Table 11 about here ---- 
(b) Displacement 
Amidst the climate of fear caused by the genocide and the advancement of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front in 1994, almost 2 million people - about 25% of the Rwandan population - sought refuge in 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
43"Verpoorten (2012) provides details on the compilation of this dataset."
44"The coefficient of the Excess Mortality Index turns significant when the alternative age cohorts 8-17 or 6-22 are 
considered. "
45"This information is taken from Justino and Verwimp (2008), who constructed their index based on event data 
from various sources."
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the case we run again the DDD model, but we now interact our treatment group with the share of 
externally displaced households living in a commune in 2002. While the 2002 census records 
detailed information on migration, it does not specifically record past refugee status and we 
therefore have to resort to a proxy. In particular, we consider the members of a household as 
having been externally displaced if in that household at least one child was born in DRC, 
Tanzania or Burundi between 1994 and 1998. Overall, 87% of the household in 2002 has at least 
one child born in that period and for 37% of these households the child was born in DRC, 
Tanzania or Burundi. We compute this share for each commune and we use it as our proxy for 
the share of displaced households living in the commune.45 Importantly, this share is not 
correlated with any conflict intensity proxy, indicating that communes that experienced higher 
conflict intensity were not more (or less) likely to host externally displaced individuals in the 
aftermath of the violence. 46  
Panel C of Table 10 reports the results. The DDD coefficient is negative and significant 
at 1%, indicating that the drop in schooling was indeed more severe in communes with a higher 
share of displaced households. This result is confirmed when we split the sample between 
communes with above-the-median versus below-the-median shares of displaced households and 
we run the DD model separately: in the former case the absolute value of the coefficient (-0.715) 
is significantly larger than in the latter case (-0.550), as reported in the row at the bottom of the 
table. At the same time, however, the coefficient of the double interaction young*postwar 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
45"In order to make sure we are truly capturing displaced Rwandan households and not simply immigrants, we 
exclude from the computation those households that, in addition to a child born abroad, also have an adult member 
that was born abroad."""
46"The highest correlation is equal to 20% and is between the displacement proxy (defined at the household level) 
and the non-genocide excess mortality proxy. We also performed a more rigorous test, regressing the displacement 
proxy over each of the different conflict intensity proxies, including province fixed effects and clustering standard 
errors at the commune level. The estimated coefficients of the conflict variables are all close to zero and none of 
them is statistically significant."
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remains negative, large and significant at 1%, indicating that external displacement cannot fully 
explain the observed drop in schooling. 
 
(c) The cycle of violent events in the 1990s had a nationwide impact 
So far we have shown that Rwanda experienced a large drop in schooling during the nineties. We 
have excluded the possibility that this drop is part of a more general time trend. We have also 
excluded our first best guess, i.e. that the drop directly relates to the localized effects of the 
genocide, and we have shown that it can neither solely be attributed to other specific forms of 
violence that took place in the nineties. Finally, the results in the previous section indicated that 
the drop is partly driven by the refugee crisis. 
Putting these pieces of evidence together leads us to conjecture that the impact of the 
genocide on schooling was nationwide, because its disruptive effect was nationwide, because it 
operated through national channels, and because the genocide coincided with other forms of 
violence and events leaving no single area in the small country unaffected. There is a basis for 
this ”residual” explanation.  
First of all, as mentioned in the previous section, the data show a very low correlation 
between the location of origin or resettlement of the externally displaced individuals and any 
conflict intensity measure, indicating that the (indirect) impact of the conflict was felt well 
beyond the conflict hotspots. 
 Second, a 1994 report from the Ministry of Education (MINEPRISEC/MINESUPRES, 
1994) indicates that the education system was severely affected with as many as 65% of the 1836 
schools reported to be damaged and needing urgent repair. Importantly, school buildings across 
the genocide-affected and other communities were equally likely to have incurred damages. We 
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test this by relying on a nationally representative community survey collected in 1999/2000 
(EICV1). The data indicate that communities more affected by the genocide were equally likely 
to be in the proximity of an operating primary school, and not more likely to have been the 
location of reconstruction or renovation works of a school building since 1994.47  
Third, besides school infrastructure, teachers had become a very scarce resource all over 
the country: many were killed, because they were Tutsi or part of the moderate Hutu elite; 
several others were imprisoned (having participated in the killings); and still others had moved 
abroad or to urban centers (Obura, 2003). The result was “the total erosion of faith in the 
education system”, with less than half of qualified teachers remaining in the primary system after 
the conclusion of the conflict (ibidem, p.48). Importantly, in the 2002 census, there is no 
relationship between the share of teachers and genocide intensity in a commune, suggesting once 
again that the disruption of the schooling system was not limited to the areas where the genocide 
was more intense, but spilled over also to the other regions of the (small) country.48  
Finally, the conflicts of the nineties heavily impacted the government budget, drying up 
resources for education. While the post-conflict era witnessed an increase in resources dedicated 
to the reconstruction of schools and infrastructures, by 2001 current spending to support the day-
to-day running of the schooling system was still as low as 3% of the GDP, the same level that the 
country had in the eighties (World Bank, 2004). 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
47"Results are based on regressions in which the dependent variable is the answer to one of the following questions: 
“Is there a primary school in the village?”, “What is the distance to the closest primary school?” and “Is there a 
school built after the 4th of July 1994 in the cell?”. The regressors include a measure of genocide intensity (results 
are robust to using any measure) and province fixed effects. Results are not reported, but available on request."
48"In order to test for this, we use information of the sector of employment for each individual from the 2002 census 
and run a simple regression of the share of teachers over the conflict intensity proxy (plus province fixed effects). 
Unfortunately the 1991 and 2002 census rounds use different classifications for sector of employment. When we try 
to make them comparable by generating a variable that groups together all education-related jobs (for 1991: 
“teaching – general” and “teaching - technical and vocational”; for 2002: “primary teaching”, “secondary teaching” 
“adavanced teaching” and “permanent education”), we find a Diff-in-Diff coefficient postwar*genocide_intensity 
not significantly different from zero. "
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9.  Conclusion 
 
By now, a large number of studies have documented the impact of armed conflict on schooling. 
Our study provides several contributions to this literature. 
First, resorting to an improved empirical strategy and a more representative dataset, our 
broad replication of AdW yields different and (we argue) more correct results. This not only 
suggests that replication of existing empirical work is not a futile exercise and should be 
encouraged, but it also indicates that survey data that is not representative at the levels of small 
administrative units or other subgroups of the population may not be appropriate for pinning 
down the heterogeneity of the conflict impact.  
Second, while previous studies have focused solely on primary schooling, our large 
dataset allowed us to estimate the impact of conflict on both primary and secondary schooling. 
We demonstrated a large drop in secondary schooling (17.4%). Furthermore, we showed how 
this drop has implications for the estimation of the drop in primary schooling. In particular, the 
estimated drop increased considerably when excluding from the control group children who were 
at secondary schooling age at the time of the conflicts. Given this finding, it is possible that 
studies that ignored the impact on secondary schooling, have underestimated the impact on 
primary schooling.  
Third, we provided novel evidence on the relative importance of the channels underlying 
the drop in schooling, i.e. school initiation, slow grade progression and dropouts. We showed 
that dropouts and slow grade progression mostly account for the drop in primary schooling, 
while school initiation is the main factor explaining the drop in secondary schooling. The finding 
that a sizeable share of the observed decline in primary schooling is driven by delays is hopeful, 
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as it leaves room for rapid recovery. In terms of implications for future research, these findings 
suggest that empirical studies should give due attention to the time elapsed since the end of the 
conflict. It would for instance be possible to find a large negative impact of conflict on schooling 
in the early postwar years but no impact or even a positive impact further down the road. In any 
case, to better design post-war recovery programs, more case studies are needed to determine 
what underlies this finding and whether it is Rwanda-specific or more general.  
Fourth, we provided new results on the effect of armed conflict on children from non-
poor households (versus those from poor households) and on exposed boys (versus girls). 
Including all constitutive components of the interaction terms, and using a very large sample, we 
found no conclusive results regarding the heterogeneous impact across poor and non-poor 
households and an additional – albeit small – negative effect for exposed girls. Such accurate 
information on the heterogeneity of the impact is important for the targeting of post-war policies. 
Fifth, we demonstrated that the drop in schooling cannot be attributed to the localized 
effects of the genocide, even when using data with complete geographic coverage and very fine 
genocide intensity measures. We ruled out that this result stems from pre-war regional trends, 
migration, selective killings, or targeted assistance to genocide survivors: correcting for these 
factors did not explain away the large drop in schooling, which is observed also in areas where 
very few Tutsi lived prior to the genocide.  
At first sight, it may seem counterintuitive that one of the largest mass killing of the 21st 
century does not stand out in its effect on schooling, but we argued that there are reasons to 
assume that the impact of the genocide on the drop in schooling was nationwide. Not only did 
the genocide dry up the government budget, but it also triggered other disruptive events and 
several other forms of violence. Combined, these events affected every corner of the small 
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country, and - although very different in nature compared to the genocide - these conflicts may 
have been equally disruptive to schooling. This conjecture finds support in our finding that the 
commune-level share of households that were externally displaced is not correlated with any 
specific form of violence, while it does turn up as a determinants for part of the observed drop in 
schooling. Additional empirical support comes from the EICV data, which reveal no correlation 
between functioning school infrastructure and genocide intensity.  
The conclusion armed conflict in Rwanda had a nationwide impact on schooling has 
relevant policy implications. Scholarships have been directed to genocide-affected areas and 
survivors of the genocide, being channeled through the various associations for survivors. Given 
the history of ethnic discrimination in Rwanda and its role in intensifying violence, such bias is 
not to be taken lightly. There is a danger that post-war reconstruction that is exclusively directed 
to genocide survivors might not only slow down the recovery of educational attainment, but may 
also reinforce group identities, potentially feeding ethnic grievances.  
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Figure 1. Years of schooling, across all ages of the age group 6-35 
 
a. DHS Data      b.  Census Data 
 
Figure 2. Years of schooling, across age and rural-urban 
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Figure 3. Share of students enrolled in primary and secondary school by age in 1991 
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Figure 4. School initiation, drop-out or slow grade progression? 
(a) Share of individuals that have ever been to school, by age 
 
(b) Share of individuals that have completed primary school, among those that have ever attended it, but that are no 
longer enrolled in primary school, by age 
 
(c) Average age by grade, for student population only 
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Figure 5. Comparison of the spatial pattern of DD estimates of the schooling deficit with the pre-genocide 
share of Tutsi in a commune 
(a) DD estimates, young age cohort: 6-15 (b) Pre-war commune-level share of Tutsi 
  
Top quintile (= largest schooling deficit or highest share of Tutsi) in darkest shade. The DD estimate is calculated 
for each commune separately, using log(schooling) as a dependent variable to account for the different levels of 
schoolings between communes. The map is taken from a shape file of the Rwandan administrative sectors (which is 
one level below the communes, but for which no shape file exists). The areas in white are left out of the analysis. 
They include the national parks and forests. 
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Figure 6. Schooling across ethnicity in 1991 
 
 
Figure 7. The relationship between the pre-war commune-level share of Tutsi and the share of students 6-35 
enjoying a scholarship, as reported in a 1999/2000 nationwide survey 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
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Table 2. Narrow and Broad replication of basic result
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Table 3. Poor versus non-poor 
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Table 4. Girls versus boys 
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Table 5. Alternative age cohorts and the impact on secondary schooling 
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Table 6. School initiation, slow grade progression and drop-outs 
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Table 7. Triple differenced regression with province-level conflict intensity measures 
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Table 8. Triple differenced regression with commune-level conflict intensity measures 
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Table 9. Confounding factors 
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Table 10. Alternative forms of violence & displacement 
 
55#
#
 
Table 11. Alternative forms of violence 
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APPENDIX 
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Figure A1. DDD coefficient by age 
 
Notes: The figure shows the point estimates and the 95% CI for the DDD coefficients of 
the interaction terms obtained from a regression similar to the one reported in column 
(3) of Table 4, in which the Young cohort has been replaced by the individual years, 
from 6 to 20 i.e. all the triple interactions female*postwarround*age6 etc are included, 
as well as all partial interactions.  
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Figure A2. Comparison of the spatial pattern of the different genocide intensity proxies 
(a) Pre-war commune-level share of Tutsi (b) Share of perpetrators 
 
 
(c) Mass graves location (d) Distance to the closest massgrave 
  
Top quintile in darkest shade. For figure (c) communes in which at least one massgrave was located are coloured in 
dark shade, while those in which no mass grave was found are in light shade. In figure (d) a darker shade indicates 
that the (centroid of the) commune was closer to a massgrave. The map is taken from a shape file of the Rwandan 
administrative sectors (which is one level below the communes, but for which no shape file exists). The areas in 
white are left out of the analysis. They include the national parks and forests. 
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Figure A3. Regional trends in schooling in 1991 
 
Notes: The stronghold of Habyarimana includes the northwestern provinces Gisenyi and 
Gitarama. The stronghold of the Tutsi monarchy covers Butare and Gitarama. 
 
Figure A4. Years of schooling, across age and migrants vs. non-migrants 
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Figure A5. Years of schooling, across age, high or low share of Tutsi in 1991 and paternal orphans vs. others 
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Table A1. School initiation, slow grade progression and drop-outs – girls versus boys 
 
 
